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Iraq and the “Fog of Law”
John F. Murphy*
The conference “The War in Iraq: A Legal Analysis,” from which this volumederives, covered a variety of topics and a plethora of legal issues. It was fol-
lowed by a workshop consisting of moderators of the various panels, panelists and
commentators with a view to continuing the dialogue begun at the conference. As a
commentator at the conference,1 this author was struck not only by the large num-
ber of controversial issues arising out of the conflict in Iraq, but also by the ab-
sence of clear resolution of many of these issues, both at the conference and in the
wider world outside of the conference, hence my choice of the “fog of law” as part
of the title of this article.2
By the “fog of law,” I mean not only the debate over the law as it was interpreted
and applied in Iraq; but also the issue of what law applied—national law, especially
the law of Iraq; the law of armed conflict (or, as preferred by some, “international
humanitarian law”); the law of the United Nations Charter, including Security
Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII; or no law at all.3
Although the first panel of the conference was titled “Legal Bases for Military
Operations in Iraq,” and Andru Wall presented a defense of the legality of the
March 2003 invasion of Iraq and the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime from
power,4 this topic was not a primary focus of the conference. Perhaps this was just
as well, since the legality of the war in Iraq under the jus ad bellum, the law of resort
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to the use of armed force, has been debated extensively in various other forums.
Moreover, with the passage of time and a rash of developments in Iraq that have
raised a host of other issues, the legality of the 2003 invasion has arguably become a
matter of academic interest only. It may be appropriate, however, to make two
brief observations before leaving the topic. The first is that there was general agree-
ment in the Security Council debates concerning Iraq on a “strict constructionist”
approach to the jus ad bellum. That is, the strict limits on the use of force set forth in
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter5 are subject to only two exceptions: (1) self-defense in
response to an armed attack and (2) military action taken or authorized by the Secu-
rity Council.
In the Security Council debates prior to and after the invasion, there was no in-
vocation of Article 516 as a basis for the invasion. Rather, the debate focused on
whether the particular Security Council resolutions on Iraq, including especially,
but not limited to, Resolution 1441,7 authorized the March 2003 invasion of Iraq
without the need for a further resolution explicitly authorizing such an action. The
“fog of law” in this case may have been Resolution 1441 itself, which this author has
described elsewhere as “a masterpiece of diplomatic ambiguity that masked real
differences of view between the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one
hand, and France, Germany, and Russia, on the other, in how Iraq’s failure to fulfill
its obligations under Resolution 687 should be handled.”8 In a similar vein, Michael
Glennon has suggested that Resolution 1441 “can accurately be said to lend sup-
port to both claims. This is not the hallmark of great legislation.”9
The second observation concerns whether, assuming arguendo that none of the
applicable Security Council resolutions authorized the March 2003 invasion of
Iraq, this was a “failure of the Security Council,” as suggested by Glennon, or
whether the Security Council should have accepted the US and UK proposal that it
adopt a resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to carry out
its obligation to disarm. There has been considerable debate over whether it was
necessary or desirable as a matter of policy to remove the Saddam regime to main-
tain international peace and security, but a discussion of the arguments for and
against this proposition are beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes,
it suffices to note that there was little or no prospect that the Security Council
would adopt a resolution authorizing such action, however compelling the reasons
for doing so. There is considerable evidence that, far from helping to enforce Reso-
lution 687, France, Russia and China engaged in deals with the Saddam Hussein
government that undermined the resolution’s enforcement.10 In short, the
Saddam regime was one favored by three permanent members of the Security
Council, and it is reasonable to conclude that they had no interest in its removal
20
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and would have exercised their veto power to block any Security Council resolu-
tion that sought to authorize such removal.11
Parenthetically, it may be noted that Michael Reisman has argued that Article
2(4) of the UN Charter should be construed in such a way as to enhance “the ongo-
ing right of peoples to determine their own political destinies” and “to maintain
the political independence of territorial communities so that they can continue to
express their desire for political community in a form appropriate to them.”12
Hence, in his view, some interventions are permissible under Article 2(4) if they
“serve, in terms of aggregate consequences, to increase the probability of the free
choice of peoples about their government and political structure.”13 Since the
Saddam Hussein regime was a brutal dictatorship on a local level and had twice in-
vaded its neighbors to deny them the right of self-determination, it could be argued
that the March 2003 invasion of Iraq was not a violation of Article 2(4) and that
there was therefore no need for a Security Council resolution authorizing it.
To be sure, this kind of argument has been effectively, in my opinion, refuted by
Oscar Schachter. In a direct response to Reisman,14 Schachter stated:
The difficulty with Reisman’s argument is not merely that it lacks support in the text of
the Charter or in the interpretation that states have given Article 2(4) in the past
decades. It would introduce a new normative basis for recourse to war that would give
powerful states an almost unlimited right to overthrow governments alleged to be
unresponsive to the popular will or to the goal of self-determination.15
Assuming arguendo that, as a policy matter, the Saddam Hussein regime should
have been removed from power, but the lack of Security Council authorization
stood in the way of such removal, what are the implications for appropriate ac-
tion should such a situation arise again in the future? If one agrees with Michael
Glennon’s argument that, because they have been so often flouted in the past, Arti-
cle 2(4) and other limitations on resort to force in the UN Charter are no longer in
effect, it necessarily follows that one would agree with Glennon that “[b]y 2003 the
main question facing countries considering whether to use force was not whether it
was lawful. Instead, as in the nineteenth century, they simply questioned whether it
was wise.”16 But for reasons I have set forth elsewhere, Glennon’s premise that limi-
tations on the use of force in the UN Charter are no longer in effect is not valid.17
Shortly after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Lee Feinstein, then Acting
Director of the Washington Program of the Council on Foreign Relations, and
Anne-Marie Slaughter, then Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs at Princeton University and President of the American Society
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nations run by rulers without internal checks on their power from acquiring or
using WMD [weapons of mass destruction].”18 With specific reference to Iraq,
the authors suggested:
Consider, for instance, how recognizing a duty to prevent could have changed the
debate over the war in Iraq. Under existing law, the Bush administration could justify
intervention only by arguing that Iraq held WMD in violation of Security Council
resolutions. . . . Now suppose that last March, the United States and the United
Kingdom had accepted a proposal by France, Germany, and Russia to blanket Iraq with
inspectors instead of attacking it. Presumably those inspectors would have found what
U.S. forces seem to be finding today—evidence of Iraq’s intention and capacity to build
WMD, but no existing stocks. Would the appropriate response then have been to send
the inspectors home and leave Saddam’s regime intact? The better answer would have
been to recognize from the beginning the combined threat posed by the nature of his
regime and his determination to acquire and use WMD. Invoking the duty to prevent,
the Security Council could have identified Iraq as a subject of special concern and, as it
was blanketing the country with inspectors, sought to prosecute Saddam for crimes
against humanity committed back in the 1980s.19
There are a number of problems with this proposed alternative approach to
Saddam’s Iraq. First, it should be noted that Security Council Resolution 687 had
established a Special Commission (UNSCOM) consisting of inspectors who were
to inspect and verify that Iraq had destroyed all capability for weapons of mass
destruction, but Iraq had consistently refused to allow UNSCOM to carry out its
mandate, and in 1998 had forced it to leave Iraq and refused it or a successor team
to resume this function. Only in 1999 was the Security Council able to establish
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC)20 as a successor to UNSCOM. This result is largely attributable to
heavy bombing by the United States and the United Kingdom as part of Operation
Desert Fox, which occurred in response to the withdrawal by Iraq of cooperation
with the UN weapons inspectors.21 In mid-September 2002, Iraq finally acceded to
the Council’s demand that it allow UN inspectors back into its territory, and Reso-
lution 1441 decided that
the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA [International Atomic
Energy Agency], and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution,
a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to
develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery
systems . . . .22
In Resolution 1441, the Council also decided that
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false statements or omissions to the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this
resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the
implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s
obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with
paragraphs 11 and 12 below.23
On December 7, 2002, Iraq’s declaration of its weapons fell far short of the full dis-
closure demanded by Resolution 1441. Nonetheless, Hans Blix, the chief UN in-
spector for chemical and biological weapons, in a clash with the view of US
Secretary of State Colin Powell, maintained that the inspection process was work-
ing and should be given more time and requested four more months.24
In light of Saddam’s refusal to cooperate with UN inspectors, it is highly un-
likely that he would have accepted “blanketing the country with inspectors,” espe-
cially if this was part of an effort to prosecute him for crimes against humanity
committed in the 1980s. Carrying out this policy would have required the use of
armed force. Support of Saddam by the Russian, French, German and Chinese
governments would have precluded any Security Council authorization of such
use of force.
More generally, Feinstein and Slaughter, in support of their proposal for a
doctrine of a duty to prevent weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands
of regimes like North Korea or Iran, recognize that the “contentious issue is who
decides when and how to use force.” They further recognize that the Security
Council “remains the preferred enforcer of collective measures.”25 At the same
time they state:
Given the Security Council’s propensity for paralysis, alternative means of
enforcement must be considered. The second most legitimate enforcer is the regional
organization that is most likely to be affected by the emerging threat. After that, the
next best option would be another regional organization, such as NATO, with a less
direct connection to the targeted state but with a sufficiently broad membership to
permit serious deliberation over the exercise of a collective duty. It is only after these
options are tried in good faith that unilateral action or coalitions of the willing should
be considered.
In any event, the resort to force is subject to certain “precautionary principles.” All
nonmilitary alternatives that could achieve the same ends must be tried before force
may be used, unless they can reasonably be said to be futile. Force must be exerted on
the smallest scale, for the shortest time, and at the lowest intensity necessary to achieve
its objective; the objective itself must be reasonably attainable when measured against
the likelihood of making matters worse. Finally, force should be governed by
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proportion to the harm or the threat of the harm it targets, and with due care to
spare civilians.26
From a strict legal perspective, it must be noted that the Security Council is not
only the “preferred enforcer of collective measures”; it is the only enforcer of col-
lective measures under the UN Charter paradigm qualified to use or to authorize
the use of force as a collective measure. Regional organizations, including NATO,
require Security Council approval to use force unless they are acting in collective
self-defense. But in the case of Security Council paralysis, as suggested by Feinstein
and Slaughter, they may well be the most legitimate alternative to the Security
Council to engage in armed force, subject to certain “precautionary principles”
and “fundamental principles of the laws of war.”
At this point it is time to turn to the “fog of law” topics that will be the primary
focus of the rest of this article: the occupation in Iraq and the relationship between
the law of armed conflict and international human rights law.
The Occupation in Iraq
It is generally recognized that the 1907 Hague Regulations on land warfare27 and
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 194928 constitute the primary legal documents
governing the traditional law of belligerent occupation.29 According to Eyal
Benvenisti, however, in the case of the 2003 occupation of Iraq by the United
States, Great Britain and the “coalition of the willing,” the occupants “were initially
reluctant to use the term occupation.”30 They also did not “explicitly acknowledge
their status as occupying powers nor did they invoke the Hague Regulations of
1907 or the Fourth Geneva Convention as applicable to their actions in Iraq.”31
Approximately seven months after the coalition invaded Iraq on March 20,
2003, David J. Scheffer published an article that demonstrates why the United
States and Great Britain were reluctant to use the term occupation.32 For example,
as stated by Scheffer, “[t]he occupation clauses of the Fourth Geneva Convention
are far more relevant to a belligerent occupation than to an occupation designed to
liberate a society from its repressive governance and transform it as a nation guided
by international norms and the self-determination of its liberated populace.”33
Elaborating on this thesis, Scheffer states:
In recent years, multilateral or humanitarian occupation, particularly that aimed at
enforcing international human rights law and atrocity law, has become the more
relevant factor in occupation practice. Occupation law was never designed for such
transforming exercises. While the humanitarian condition of the occupied society is a
paramount concern of the Hague Regulations of 1907, [under] the Fourth Geneva
24
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Convention, and Geneva Protocol I, a society in political, judicial, and economic
collapse or a society that has overthrown a repressive leader and seeks radical
transformation requires far more latitude for transformational development than
would be anticipated under these instruments. The society may require revolutionary
changes in its economy (including a leap into robust capitalism), rigorous
implementation of international human rights standards, a new constitution and
judiciary, and a new political structure (most likely consistent with principles of
democracy) never contemplated by occupation law or the domestic law of the
occupied territory. As just one example, the penal law requirements set forth in Article
64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention serve little, if any, purpose in areas such as Kosovo
or Iraq or, had it been in force at the time, in Germany after World War II where the
Nazi-era national penal system failed to protect individual and collective rights.34
Despite the reluctance of the United States and the United Kingdom to use the
term “occupation,” and despite their clear intention to transform Iraqi society,
they acknowledged their respective obligations to act in accordance with the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention.35 This was followed by
the Security Council issuing Resolution 1483,36 which “[c]alls upon all concerned
to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particu-
lar the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”37
Scheffer criticizes Resolution 1483 and suggests that
[t]he methodology that should have been invoked . . . was a UN Security Council
mandate establishing the transformational tasks of a military deployment and civilian
administration of a liberated society that explicitly or implicitly implemented only the
provisions of occupation law relevant to the particular situation. That methodology
was rejected by the United States immediately following the intervention.38
Instead of supporting a Security Council resolution along the lines suggested by
Scheffer, the United States and the United Kingdom established the “Coalition
Provisional Authority” (CPA), which “replaced the domestic system of governance
with a temporary command structure that ruled the country based on the author-
ity of the ‘relevant U.N. Security resolutions, and the laws and usages of war.’”39
The Security Council formally recognized the CPA in Resolution 1511 of October
16, 2003.40
These developments created a major “fog of law” in Iraq because, as noted by
Yoram Dinstein, “[w]ithin a brief stretch of time, the Coalition Provisional Au-
thority carried a whole string of legislative and other measures designed to bring
about large-scale reforms.”41 As Scheffer notes, however, by enacting Resolution
1483, the Council “specified additional obligations not required by occupation
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occupation law otherwise would impose on occupying powers.”42 He suggests
further that
[i]n each of these areas of responsibility, a strict reading of occupation law likely would
prohibit such bold and transformational control of Iraqi society and economy, unless
one views the Security Council decisions as legitimately overriding conflicting norms
of occupation law.[43] If such is the case, then the Council’s insistence elsewhere in
Resolution 1483 on compliance with occupation law breeds confusion.44
Interestingly, Scheffer sets forth a lengthy list of acts or omissions of the occupying
powers in Iraq that “[i]f proven true . . . may invite varying degrees of civil liability or
criminal culpability under occupation law . . . .”45 Later, Scheffer admits that
this rather anemic body of international law remains difficult to enforce against either
governments or individuals. This is not surprising given the paucity of enforceable
penalties under international treaties and national criminal codes and the reluctance of
national courts to second guess the public policy decisions that dominate occupation
practice. For example, a private right of action against the U.S. government for its
conduct during an occupation of foreign territory would be problematic.46
Gregory Fox has extensively examined the issue of the extent to which the CPA’s
actions were compatible with the traditional law of occupation.47 As an “alternative
source” of legitimacy of CPA reforms, he also evaluates the argument that, by
adopting Resolution 1483, the Security Council “ratified the [CPA] reforms by ef-
fectively legislating a set of goals for the occupation that superseded the limitations
of Hague and Geneva law.”48 He concludes, correctly in this author’s view, that
many of the CPA’s reforms were incompatible with the traditional law of occupa-
tion and that the Security Council had not ratified these reforms.49
Eyal Benvenisti has a somewhat different view from Fox’s concerning the effect
of Resolution 1483 on the law of occupation applicable to the CPA:
Resolution 1483 can be seen as the latest and most authoritative restatement of several
basic principles of the contemporary law of occupation. It endorses several theses
developed in this book. First, it revives the neutral connotation of the doctrine.
Occupation is a temporary measure for reestablishing order and civil life after the end
of active hostilities, benefiting also, if not primarily, the civilian population. As such,
occupation does not amount to unlawful alien domination that entitles the local
population to struggle against it. Second, sovereignty inheres in the people, and
consequently regime collapse does not extinguish sovereignty. Thus, the Resolution
implicitly confirms the demise of the doctrine of debellatio, which would have passed
sovereign title to the occupant in case of total defeat and disintegration of the
governing regime. Instead, and notwithstanding the requirement of Article 43 of the
26
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Hague Regulations to “respect . . . , unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country,” Resolution 1483 grants a mandate to the occupants to transform the
previous legal system to enable the Iraqi people “freely to determine their own political
future and control their own natural resources . . . to form a representative government
based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without
regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender.” Hence, the law of occupation, according to
Resolution 1483, connotes respect to popular sovereignty, not to the demised regime.
Third, the Resolution recognizes in principle the continued applicability of
international human rights law in occupied territories in tandem with the law of
occupation. Human rights law may thus complement the law of occupation on specific
matters. Fourth, Resolution 1483 envisions the role of the modern occupant as the role
of the heavily involved regulator, when it calls upon the occupants to pursue an
“effective administration” of Iraq. This call stands in contrast to the initial orientation
of the Hague Regulations, which envisioned a disinterested occupant who does not
intervene in the lives of the occupied population. In the years since, such an “inactive
custodian” approach has been rejected as unacceptable. The call to administer the
occupied area “effectively” acknowledges the several duties that the occupants must
perform to protect the occupied population. It precludes the occupant from hiding
behind the limits imposed on its powers as a pretext for inaction.50
Elsewhere, Benvenisti acknowledges that Resolution 1483 “did not address a
number of key questions concerning the further adaptation of the law of occupation
to contemporary governance.”51 Nonetheless, it is clear that he considers the con-
temporary law of occupation more adequate for governing an occupation like that
in Iraq, where the goal is regime change and radical changes in law and policy of the
occupied territory, than do Scheffer and Fox. In such situations, the latter two
commentators appear to favor “the establishment of a United Nations legal frame-
work to govern the foreign military deployment and civilian administration.”52
This author tends to favor the Scheffer/Fox approach because a United Nations
legal framework would have the potential to bring greater clarity to a murky area
and thus lift, at least in part, the “fog of law.” It is unclear, however, the extent to
which future occupations will have goals similar to those of the occupation in Iraq.
If UN member States were to take seriously the so-called “responsibility to pro-
tect,” there would be a considerable likelihood of occupations along the Iraq
model. At this writing, however, the “responsibility to protect” is under attack in
the United Nations and its future is uncertain.53
The Law of International Armed Conflict and International Human Rights
By way of transition from the previous section, it should be noted, as Yoram
Dinstein has helpfully pointed out, that, despite the reluctance of the occupying
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their being ill-suited to the transformative objectives they had in mind, “[i]n the
event, the status of belligerent occupation in Iraq remained legally valid for just a
little over a year . . . .”54 By adopting Resolution 1546,55 the Security Council set in
train the process whereby the belligerent occupation came to an end. Specifically,
the Council declared that “by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coali-
tion Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and . . . Iraq will reassert its full sover-
eignty.”56 Two days earlier than the deadline CPA Administrator Paul Bremer
formally transferred political authority to the Iraqi interim government and left the
country.57
The practical effect of Resolution 1546, however, is unclear. Yoram Dinstein has
suggested:
In theory, since the end of June 2004, the continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq
is by invitation of the new Iraqi government. In practice, there was little change on the
ground following the decreed termination of the occupation. As long as coalition
forces are engaged in combat in order to extinguish pockets of resistance of the ancien
regime (or its putative supporters)—exercising at least some administrative authority
in certain areas of Iraq—the occupation has come to a close only “notionally.”58
As we shall see later in this article, the situation has changed radically recently with
the adoption of two international agreements between the United States and the
Iraq government.
As to the applicability of human rights law to the period of belligerent occupa-
tion of Iraq, this has been a question of some controversy. The United States, for
example, takes the position that the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)59 does not apply outside of the United States or its special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction and that it does not apply to operations of the mili-
tary during an international armed conflict.60 The US position that the ICCPR does
not apply outside of the territory of the United States has been rejected by the
United Nations Human Rights Committee61 and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in an advisory opinion.62 It is worth noting, however, that neither the views of
the Human Rights Committee nor the ICJ’s advisory opinion has any binding ef-
fect, and the United States and other countries have maintained their position.
The United States has also maintained that the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment applies only
within US territory, although the territorial scope clause that appears in several
articles of this convention contains the phrase “in any territory under its jurisdic-
tion.”63 Leading authorities on the drafting history of the Convention have con-
cluded that this phrase extends the treaty to “territories under military occupation,
to colonial territories and to any other territories over which a State has factual
28
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control.”64 For its part, the UN Committee against Torture, which is the Conven-
tion’s counterpart to the UN Human Rights Committee, has endorsed an “effec-
tive control” standard and concluded that “this includes all areas under the de facto
effective control of the State party, by whichever military or civil authorities such
control is exercised. The Committee considers [the US] view that those provisions
are geographically limited to its own de jure territory to be regrettable.”65 Again,
the United States is not bound by the views of the Committee against Torture and
has maintained its position to the contrary. As is so often his practice, however,
Dinstein adds another consideration to the mix:
As treaty laws, the Covenant and the European Convention (whatever the correct in-
terpretations of their texts) are, of course, limited in application to Contracting Par-
ties. But it is necessary to pay heed to the customary law of human rights, which is
frequently reflected in the substantive clauses of these instruments. Customary human
rights are conferred on human beings wherever they are. Irrefutably, the inhabitants of
occupied territories are in principle entitled to benefit from the customary corpus of
human rights that coexists with the law of belligerent occupation. The International
Court of Justice observed, in the Armed Activities case, that “both branches of interna-
tional law, namely, international human rights law and international humanitarian
law, would have to be taken into consideration” in occupied territories.66
The US view that the ICCPR does not apply to operations of the military during
international armed conflict is contrary to the view expressed in two advisory opin-
ions of the International Court of Justice: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons67 and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory.68 In its Nuclear Weapons opinion, the Court stated that “the pro-
tection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in
times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain pro-
visions may be derogated from in a time of emergency.”69 Similarly, the Court
opined in Wall that “the Court considers that the protection offered by human
rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect
of provisions for derogation of the kind found in Article 4 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights.”70
Dinstein has provided a concise rationale to support the ICJ view: “The very fact
derogation is required to suspend the operation of given stipulations of the
Covenant in wartime attests that—when no permissible derogation is in effect—
human rights continue to be in force.”71
To be sure, as Dinstein notes, Article 4(1) of the ICCPR72 does not contain any
explicit reference to war or even armed conflict.73 Dinstein, however, quotes
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eminent authority on human rights, to deny any legal significance to this omission:
“the omission of specific reference to war was surely not intended to deny the right
of derogation in wartime; war is the most dramatic example of a public emergency
which might ‘threaten the life of the nation.’”74 It is noteworthy that neither the
United States nor the United Kingdom has invoked Article 4 of the Covenant with
respect to Iraq.
Elsewhere in his treatise The International Law of Belligerent Occupation,
Dinstein discusses in detail Article 4(1), as well as the general subject of
derogations from obligations to respect human rights.75 In a section on non-
derogable human rights,76 Dinstein compares the non-derogable provisions of the
ICCPR, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
and the American Convention on Human Rights.77 He concludes that “[t]he lists
of non-derogable human rights appearing in the three instruments coincide in part
but they are not conterminous”78 and illustrates this fact in some detail.79 Perhaps
the most interesting observation Dinstein makes in this exercise is set forth below:
It is surprising that the human right to judicial guarantees of fair trial—enshrined in all
the instruments—is not included in the list of non-derogable rights. Only the
American Convention enumerates as non-derogable those judicial guarantees that are
essential to the protection of other non-derogable rights. This loose end was deftly used
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights—in two Advisory Opinions delivered
on the subject in 1987—to extrapolate that judicial remedies like the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo can never be derogated, and they can therefore be used to exercise
control also over the suspension of derogable rights.[80] More radically, the Human
Rights Committee expressed the non-binding view—in General Comment No. 29 of
2001—that the list of non-derogable rights (as it appears in Article 4(2) of the
Covenant) is not exhaustive, and there can be no derogation (in particular) from
judicial guarantees.81
In subsequent sections of his treatise, Dinstein, in a tour de force, explores the
many nuances of the following topics: “Built-in limitations of human rights,”
including “Explicit limitations” and “Implicit limitations”;82 “Balance between
competing human rights”;83 and “The Interaction between the law of belligerent
occupation and the law of human rights,” including “Convergence and diver-
gence,” “The advantages of the law of belligerent occupation,” “The advantages of
human rights law” and “The lex specialis rule.”84 Time and space limitations pre-
clude exploring Dinstein’s treatment of these important topics in any depth. It is
fair to say, however, that it helps to lift the “fog of law” covering some very impor-
tant issues. In particular, it effectively refutes the thesis that the law of interna-
tional armed conflict and international human rights are mutually exclusive;
30
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illustrates how, “[f]or the most part, in occupied territories, there is enough room
for a symbiotic relationship between the two [branches of international law]”;85
suggests that
[w]hen both alternative paths of human rights law and the law of belligerent
occupation are open to a protected person whose rights have been infringed in an
occupied territory, there may be a practical advantage in exploring the former, since an
international mechanism may be readily available, enabling the injured party to seek
and obtain effective redress . . . 86
and points out that, in the event of an irreconcilable conflict between the two fields
of law, “the special law of belligerent occupation trumps the general law of human
rights on the ground of lex specialis derogat lex generali.”87
As noted earlier, on June 28, 2004, CPA Administrator Paul Bremer formally
transferred political authority to the Iraqi interim government,88 two days prior to
the date decreed by the Security Council in Resolution 1546.89 At that time, pursuant
to Resolution 1546, the occupation came to an end and Iraq asserted its full
sovereignty.90 To be sure, as reported earlier, Dinstein, quoting and citing Adam
Roberts, has suggested that the occupation came to a close only “notionally” be-
cause there was little change on the ground following the decreed termination of
the occupation.91
At present, however, the occupation has come to a close more than notionally.
Exercising its sovereign powers, the government of Iraq has entered into two inter-
national agreements with the United States that have radically changed the power
balance in Iraq.
The Strategic Framework Agreement and the Security Agreement
In Resolution 1511,92 the Security Council authorized the multinational force in
Iraq. This resolution was followed by Resolution 1546,93 which, in addition to
bringing the occupation of Iraq to an end, reaffirmed the authorization for the
multinational force.94 Resolution 1546 was in turn followed by a series of other
resolutions that reaffirmed and extended the authorization for the multinational
force. The last of these was Resolution 1790,95 which provided that the authoriza-
tion of the multinational force would expire on January 1, 2009. Prior to the expi-
ration of the authorization of the multinational force, on November 17, 2008 the
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The two agreements are (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relation-
ship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the
Republic of Iraq (SFA)96 and (2) the Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from
Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in
Iraq (SA).97 Interestingly, the executive branch initially intended that the SFA
would be a non-binding political commitment in order that it would be free from
the US constitutional constraints that apply to international legal agreements;98
however, the United States and Iraq decided to recast the SFA as a legally binding
treaty commitment, like the SA.99
It is noteworthy that neither agreement uses the term “status of forces agreement”
or SOFA.100 Commander Trevor A. Rush has explained the reason for the absence
of the term SOFA:
First, in a technical sense, it is not accurate to use the term SOFA for either of the two
agreements. The SFA is an agreement that defines the long-term strategic relationship
between the U.S. Government and the [government of Iraq]. It contains none of the
typical provisions one might expect to find in a SOFA and, with regard to “Defense and
Security Cooperation,” the SFA contains no actual substance. Instead, it specifically
refers to the U.S.-Iraq SA, for the nature of that cooperation. On the other hand, the SA
goes far beyond a regular SOFA, to include authorizing combat missions and
detentions, discussing the deterrence of “security threats” and the termination of U.N.
Security Council measures, as well as U.S. efforts to safeguard Iraqi economic assets
and obtain Iraq debt forgiveness.[101]
Second, and more importantly, the reason not to use the term SOFA for these two
agreements is related to the significant political sensitivities surrounding the presence
of foreign forces in the Middle East. The coalition campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
have added new twenty-first century images to those deep-seated regional concerns.
History has witnessed various western powers seek to control Middle Eastern
territories, but these attempts at colonization and foreign domination have ultimately,
always, been rejected. In this context, a “SOFA” can give the impression of a willing
consent to permanent foreign military occupation. Skeptics need only look to such
places as Europe, Korea, and Japan and see more than half a century of U.S. military
presence operating under SOFAs.102
Rush gives an extensive and excellent overview of both the SFA and the SA. No
attempt will be made in this article to match Rush’s efforts. It is significant, how-
ever, that Rush is of the view that “these U.S.-Iraq agreements should be heralded
as a major step forward in Iraq’s assumption of responsibility for its own security
and governance.”103 At the same time, Rush recognizes that application of the
agreements can give rise to disputes between the United States and Iraq. He notes
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that, at the time of writing, the United States had already been accused of violating
the SA through a military raid that left two people dead,104 and suggests that “the
first true test of public perception could come in 2009 if an Iraqi referendum on the
agreements is held as planned.”105 At this writing, however, it is uncertain whether
such a referendum will take place. Although Sunni lawmakers insisted that a refer-
endum on the SA be held as a condition for their support, and a referendum was
originally scheduled for July of 2009, it was delayed. In August, Iraq’s cabinet offi-
cially set a new date of January 16, 2010 for the referendum, a date coinciding with
nationwide parliamentary polls.106
The SA calls for all American troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.107 If
Iraqi voters reject the SA in a referendum held on January 16, 2010, this would
force an accelerated US withdrawal, resulting in a full American troop withdrawal
almost a year ahead of schedule. Recent reports, however, indicate that worry over
Iraq’s ability to take over security from the United States faster—should the refer-
endum force an early American withdrawal—“appears to have cooled some
Sunnis’ insistence on the referendum,” and some Sunni politicians have reportedly
said that a referendum was no longer necessary because the US military had so far
abided by the SA.108
Even if no referendum is held on the SA, Article 30, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the
SA allows either party to terminate the agreement one year after written notice is
given to the other party.109 As noted by Rush in his article, there are a number of
provisions in the SA that may prove to be significant friction points between the
United States and Iraq.110 As to ways to minimize the chances of a breakdown in
US-Iraqi relations leading to termination of the SA, Rush sets forth the following
poignant suggestions in the concluding paragraph of his article:
There are two clear ways to help ensure the SA is viewed positively by the Iraqis. First,
U.S. leaders must make every effort to adhere to the terms. This article has identified
various gray areas where friction may occur. These areas must be handled delicately
and in cooperation with Iraqi counter-parts [sic]. Although the United States must
protect its interests, it must not do so in a way that sacrifices the greater objective of
maintaining good relations with Iraq. The United States cannot be seen as exploiting its
position or strong-arming Iraq. To do so risks public condemnation and loss of public
support. The second way to help ensure the SA is viewed positively falls on the
shoulders of every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, Coast Guardsman, and Civilian of
the U.S. Forces serving in Iraq. There is no room for any misconduct toward Iraqi
citizens, nor can individuals afford to act beyond the scope of their missions. A single
failure in this area is potentially catastrophic to the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The
U.S. chain of command must continue to impress upon all members of the U.S. Forces
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conduct and their good relations with the Iraqis that they are in Iraq to support and
protect.111
A Few Concluding Observations
At this writing, the SA appears to be functioning effectively. In accordance with
Article 24 of the SA,112 all US combat forces have been withdrawn from Iraqi cities,
villages and localities and have been stationed in agreed facilities and areas out-
side these cities, villages and localities. Although this is not entirely clear from
published reports, it appears that the primary function of US troops in their new
locations is to train and advise Iraqi forces, rather than carry a major burden in
combat.
To be sure, areas of instability still remain, especially in the city of Mosul and
northern Iraq, where unresolved Kurdish-Arab tensions over oil and political con-
trol of the area remain. Nonetheless, the top US commander in Iraq, General Ray-
mond Odierno, has reportedly said he is
increasingly confident Iraq’s recent security gains are irreversible despite high-profile
attacks like the string of bombings in Baghdad last month [August] that killed roughly
100 people. “We’ll have bad days in Iraq,” he said. “But the bad days are becoming
fewer. The numbers of deaths are becoming fewer. We’re making slow, deliberate
progress.”113
Perhaps the most encouraging development at this juncture is reports of the de-
cline of the religious and sectarian parties that have fractured Iraq since 2003 and of
a movement emphasizing national unity that seeks to reach across ethnic or sectar-
ian lines.114 If this movement continues, the chances of the national elections
scheduled for January 2010 going well will greatly improve.
Last year the United States and Iraq agreed that American combat forces would
be out of Iraq by August 2010, leaving fifty thousand troops to advise and support
the Iraqis.115 General Odierno, however, has reportedly stated that he could reduce
American forces to that level even before the summer of 2010 if the expected Janu-
ary elections in Iraq go well.116 This could ease the current strain on US forces and
free up extra combat troops for duty in the Afghanistan war, especially if the
Obama administration decides to accede to the military’s request for more combat
troops in Afghanistan.
There is, of course, no guarantee of success in Iraq. But it is clear that ultimate
success or failure is now largely in the hands of a sovereign Iraq government. If suc-
cess in Iraq is ultimately achieved, the implications for greater stability in the Mid-
dle East will be enormous. Not a bad denouement for a “war of choice.”
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87. Id. To illustrate an application of the lex specialis rule, Dinstein quotes from the Interna-
tional Court of Justice’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. The issue facing the Court in these
proceedings was the relationship between the law of international armed conflict and Article
6(1) of the ICCPR, which provides that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” The
Court stated:
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in
hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of
life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary
deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the
Covenant itself.
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97. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the With-
drawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their
Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/
images/CGs_Messages/security_agreement.pdf [hereinafter SA].
98. See Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomber, “Political” Commitments and the Consti-
tution, 49 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 507, 510 (2009).
99. Id. at 510.
100. See Trevor A. Rush, Don’t Call It a SOFA! An Overview of the U.S. Security Agreement,
ARMY LAWYER, May 2009, at 34.
101. Rush cites the following provisions of the SA: Article 4 (missions), Article 22 (detention),
Article 25 (measures to terminate the application of Chapter VII to Iraq), Article 26 (Iraqi assets)
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102. Rush, supra note 100, at 34–35.
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104. Id.
105. Id.
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this Article.” Paragraph 3 provides: “This Agreement shall terminate one year after a Party pro-
vides written notification to the other Party to that effect.”
110. For example, Rush highlights Article 4 of the SA, which covers “missions” or military op-
erations. As to Article 4, Rush states:
Article 4 of the SA covers “missions” or military operations and is one of the articles
which make the agreement fundamentally different from all other U.S. SOFAs. Article 4
begins with a request from the GOI [government of Iraq] for “the temporary assistance
of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain
security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of operations
against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former
regime.” Standard SOFAs do not discuss engaging in combat operations, whereas this
SA provision invites U.S. Forces to participate in Iraq’s internal armed conflict. It also
provides internationally accepted legal authority for U.S. Forces to conduct combat
operations in Iraq. This was necessary to fill the legal vacuum created by the expiration
of [UN Security Council Resolution]1790.
The SA’s grant of authority for military operations is based upon Iraq’s sovereignty,
which includes the right to consent to the presence of the U.S. military and to allow the
United States to conduct military operations that comply with international and
domestic Iraqi law. This differs from the U.N. Security Council’s Chapter VII
authorization to the multinational force to “take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.” Now, instead of U.S. Forces operating
unilaterally, subject only to multinational force regulations and rules, their operations
must be . . . “conducted with the agreement of the Government of Iraq” and, in fact,
must “be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities.” This coordination “shall be overseen
by a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee [hereinafter JMOCC] to be
established pursuant to” the SA. Lastly, military operations “shall not infringe upon the
sovereignty of Iraq and its national interests, as defined by the Government of Iraq.”
The practical reality of these limitations is that U.S. commanders must work “by, with,
and through” the Iraqis and develop processes for obtaining the appropriate Iraqi
operating authorities. Preferably this cooperation and coordination is occurring at the
lowest levels through U.S. commanders’ relationships with the GOI and Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) leadership. However, the exact level of mission coordination required by
Article 4 may prove to be a significant friction point between the United States and Iraq.
For instance, in April 2009, U.S. Forces conducted a raid in Wasit province that left two
Iraqis dead and resulted in the detention of six men. The raid “set off public protests
and drew a pointed complaint from Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki that the
operation violated [the SA].” U.S. Forces issued a statement that “the raid had been
‘fully coordinated and approved’ by the Iraqi government.” At the same time, “the Iraqi
Defense Ministry announced it had detained two top Iraqi military officials in Wasit
province for authorizing the American raid without obtaining approval from their
commanders.” This incident illustrates the difficulties of coordination, but despite the
inherent challenges in such processes, the transition of security responsibilities to the
ISF is a necessary part of creating a stable Iraq in which the ISF assumes the major role
for defending the nation.
Rush, supra note 100, at 38–40.
111. Id. at 60.
112. Article 24 of the SA, supra note 97, reads as follows:
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Article 24
Withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq
Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, the
assumption of full security responsibility by those Forces, and based upon the strong
relationship between the Parties, an agreement on the following has been reached:
1. All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than
December 31, 2011.
2. All United States combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and
localities no later than the time at which Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility
for security in an Iraqi province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later
than June 30, 2009.
3. United States combat forces withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 2 above shall be
stationed in the agreed facilities and areas outside cities, villages, and localities to be
designated by the JMOCC [Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee] before
the date established in paragraph 2 above.
4. The United States recognizes the sovereign right of the Government of Iraq to
request the departure of the United States Forces from Iraq at any time. The
Government of Iraq recognizes the sovereign right of the United States to withdraw the
United States Forces from Iraq at any time.
5. The Parties agree to establish mechanisms and arrangements to reduce the number
of the United States Forces during the periods of time that have been determined, and
they shall agree on the locations where the United States Forces will be present.
113. See Youchi J. Dreazen, U.S. General Says Iraq Exit Is on Track, WSJ.COM, Sept. 30, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125426788854050939.html.
114. See Steven Lee Myers, National Unity is Rallying Cry in Iraq Elections, NEW YORK TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2009, at A1.
115. See Thom Shanker, U.S. General Says Iraq Troop Reductions May Quicken if Elections Go
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